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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH
Case No. 981529-CA

Plaintiff/Appellant,

SAMUEL ENRICQUE BRACERO,
ARTURO RUIZ,

:

Defendants/Appellees.

:

Priority No. 2

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ARGUMENT
In addition to the facts and arguments contained in the State/Appellant's opening
brief, the State submits the following points in reply to the statements and arguments
contained in defendant/appellee's responsive brief.

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' POINT ONE
A.

Because Neither Defendant Could Lawfully Drive, the
Request to Search Did Not Create Any Detention Outside
the Ongoing Traffic Purpose of the Stop

Any detention engendered by the trooper's request to search for contraband in this
case was justified on the ground that it was merely incident to the ongoing traffic purpose
of the stop. See Aplt. Br. at 12-15. Indeed, the trial court found that neither defendant
was legally authorized to possess or drive the Tempo (R. 150), Aplt. Br., add. H. This
critical factual finding is the linchpin of the State's argument regarding the propriety of

the ongoing detention. Aplt. Br. at 13-15 (citing (R.160: 15), add. C). See State v. Lonez,
873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994) ("Investigative questioning that further detains the
driver must be supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity/');
State v. O'Brien, 959 P.2d 647 648 (Utah App. 1998) (defendant was not unjustifiably
detained where trooper looked into defendant's truck as a safety precaution before
requesting vehicle registration information). Consequently, the State disagrees only with
the trial court's legal conclusion that, in the absence of a reasonable suspicion of other
criminality, defendants were improperly detained by the request to search. Aplt. Br. at
13.
Defendants' responsive brief acknowledges that the trooper "could have detained
and arrested defendants for traffic violations," and that the Tempo "might have been
stolen," but asserts that it simply "does not matter[.]" Aple. Br. at 12. Instead, defendants
contend that the trooper should have ignored his reasonable suspicion that the vehicle
may have been stolen, ignored the fact that neither defendant was a licensed driver, and
should have simply issued a traffic citation before allowing defendants to proceed on their
way. Aple. Br. at 8-9. Defendants' glib assertion is unsupported by citation to authority
and is contrary to Lopez, O'Brien, and other controlling authority. See Aplt. Br. at 12-15.
See also Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9), (b) (requiring appellee to support contentions with
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citation to authorities relied upon).1 It is also contrary to the trial court's factual findings
(R 150), Aplt. Br., add. H.
As appellees defendants may offer an alternative ground upon which to affirm the
lower court's ruling. State v. South, 924 P.2d 354, 356-57 (Utah 1996) However, any
alternative argumcm must be clearly supported in the record. Leigh Furniture and Carpet
Co. v. horn, 657 ?.2.i 293, 301 (Utah 1982). Here, the trial court found that neither
defendant was legally authorized to drive; therefore, defendants' alternative argument that
the trooper should have cited and released defendants, is not supported in the record and
defendants cannot prevail in their claim without demonstrating that the trial court's
findings are clearly erroneous. Cf State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475 (Utah 1990)
("When challenging the findings of fact of the trial court on appeal, the [challenging
party] must show that the findings of fact were clearly erroneous."). Significantly,
defendants make no such challenge here. See Aplt. Br. at 8-10. Nor could they. It is
undisputed that Bracero's license was suspended and that Ruiz's license was expired (R.
160: 15-16, 39), Apit. Br., add. C.2 Thus, contrary to defendants' assertion, Trooper Metz

defendants' responsive brief is primarily directed toward the State's alternative
argument, that even assuming defendants were detained beyond the traffic purpose of the
stop by the trooper's request for consent, that detention was justified by reasonable
suspicion. The State further addresses this argument in part B of this point.
defendants' complaint that Trooper Metz did not specifically ask Ruiz for a
driver's license, Aple. Br. at 9, avails them nothing. After learning that Bracero's license
was suspended, the trooper asked Ruiz for identification and Ruiz provided the trooper
with citizenship papers only (R. 160:15), Aplt. Br., add. C. The trooper did not
3

was not free to cite defendants and allow them to proceed on their way. S<>e Aplt. Br. at
14.
In sum, defendants' assertion that the trooper should have simply cited and
released them is not clearly supported in the record. Defendants simply cannot
demonstrate that the trial court's factual finding, that neither was legally authorized to
drive, is clearly erroneous. Indeed, Bracero's license was suspended and Ruiz's license
was expired. Moreover, defendants' assertion is also devoid of supportive authority.
Therefore, the State's argument, that the trooper's request to search did not unjustifiably
detain defendants, stands unrebutted. The trial court's erroneous legal conclusion, that
defendants were improperly detained by the request, should thus be overturned.
B.

Any Detention Outside the Traffic Purpose of the Stop
Was Supported by Reasonable Suspicion of Defendants9
Involvement in Drug Trafficking

Even assuming, arguendo, defendants were detained beyond legitimate traffic
purposes by the trooper's request to search, that detention was justified by reasonable
suspicion. Aplt. Br. at 16-22. In arguing to the contrary, defendants make the same

immediately inquire if Ruiz had a valid driver's license, and it is not clear when the
trooper confirmed that Ruiz's license was in fact expired (R. 160: 39), Aplt. Br., add. C.
However, even if the trooper had specifically, inquired about Ruiz's license at the same
time he asked about Bracero's license, defendants fail to demonstrate that Ruiz could
have lawfully driven the Tempo away, nor could they, in light of Ruiz's expired license
(R. 160: 39), Aplt. Br., add. C.
4

mistakes the trial court made: they misapply the totality of the circumstances and ignore
controlling authority.
Tlic ti ial ourt's critical error - an error appellant follows on appeal - was in
viewing each of the factors contributing to the reasonable suspicion calculus in isolation
(see R. 152-150), Aplt. Br., add. H. Contrary to the trial court's erroneous isolation
analysis, factors contributing to reasonable suspicion must be seen as part of the "totality
of the circumstances facing the officer at the time of the stop." State v. Shepard, 955 P.2d
352, 355 (Utah 1998).
Here, it is undisputed that Trooper Metz detected the strong odor of air freshener, a
recognized masking agent, and that Ruiz had a history of drug smuggling (R. 152-50),
Aplt. Br., adi

The confluence of these factors is alone sufficient to create reasonable

suspicion that defendants were involved in drug trafficking. Aplt. t5

7 (citing United

States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez, 57 F.3d 895, 898 (10th Cir. 1995) (reasonable suspicion
established based on use of masking agent and computer hit indicating that defendant had
previously been referred to Customs for zero tolerance drugs"); United States v. Stone,
866 F.2d 359, 362 (10th Cir. 1989) (reasonable suspicion established based on use of
recognized masking agent and DEA computer indication that defendant was involved in
drug trafficking)). See also United States v. Ledesma-Dominguez, 53 F.3d 1159, 1161
(10th Cir. 1995) (absence of personal identification, together with defendant's nervous
behavior and presence of masking odor established reasonable suspicion); United States

5

v. Finke, 85 F.3d 1275, 1280 (7th Cir. 1996) (defendant's suspicious behavior and
criminal history including two prior drug convictions constituted reasonable suspicion for
detention); United States v. Pollington, 98 F.3d 341 (8th Cir. 1996) (odor of masking
agent, together with defendant's suspicious story and visibly nervous conduct sufficient to
establish reasonable suspicion); People v. Easley, 680 N.E.2d 776, 780 (111. App. 1997)
(marijuana leaf decoration in defendant's wallet, together with defendant's visible
nervousness, suspicious behavior, and prior drug conviction established reasonable
suspicion), cert, denied,

U.S.

, 119 S.Ct 1144 (1999); State v. Armstrong, 659

N.E.2d 844, 847 (Ohio App. 1995) (high crime area and suspicious nature of defendant's
activity in huddling with a group with hands moving within the tight group, together with
defendant's history of drug offenses, created reasonable suspicion). Added to these
compelling factors, however, are the additional facts in this case that the stop occurred on
a recognized drug route (1-15), defendants were unusually nervous in that they refused to
make eye contact with the trooper, and neither defendant was legally authorized to drive
or posses the Tempo.3 While any one of the above factors would not by itself support

3

The trial court discounted the trooper's additional observations of maps, a cell
phone, and gapped molding (R. 151-50), Aplt. Br., add. H. For reasons stated in its
opening brief, the State disagrees with the trial court's rulings in this regard. Aplt. Br. at
19 n.6. However, as noted previously, the strong smell of masking agent and Ruiz's drug
history are themselves so compelling that the reasonable suspicion determination does not
turn on the presence of these disputed factors. Thus, even assuming the trial court
properly discounted the trooper's observations in this regard, there remains reasonable
suspicion defendants were involved in drug trafficking.
6

reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking, when properly considered together, they amount
to reasonable suspicion as a matter of law. See Apit. Br. at 16-20. See Easley, 680
N.E.2d at 780 ("Even where there may be an innocent explanation for each individual
factor considered separately, the factors viewed in combination may constitute enough
reasonable suspicion to warrant further detention.'9).
The trial court's error in conducting an "isolation," as opposeu to a
"totality,"analysis is compounded by its failure to give any weight to the Ruiz's drug
smuggling history (R. 152-50), Aplt. Br., add. H. This failure was driven by the trial
court's misapprehension of State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137, 143 (Utah App. 1997),
which in fact clarifies that criminal history may be a factor in determining reasonable
suspicion. Aplt. Br ill 11 Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of law when it
failed to consider Ruiz's history of drug smuggling in its evaluation of reasonable
suspicion here (see R. 152-50), Aplt. Br., add. H. Defendants' responsive brief does not
address the trial court's misreading of Humphrey. Indeed, while defendants acknowledge
that Ruiz h;ul ,i history of drug smuggling in their Statement of Facts, Aple. Br. at 5, this
compelling fact is not otherwise mentioned or analyzed in defendants' brief. Thus, once
again, the State's assertion of error below is effectively unrebutted.
Finally, to the extent that defendants attempt to support the trial court's erroneous
conclusion that no reasonable suspicion existed, their analysis lacks merit. Defendants
rely on State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992) and State v. Robinson, 797
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P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990), to support the trial coi ,r t's determination of no reasonable
suspicion. While these cases involve traffic-stops-turned-criminal-investigations, that is
where the similarity to the instmt case ends. Neither Godina-Luna nor Robinson involves
a traffic stop where the evolving criminal investigation was triggered by the observation
and detection of the strong odor of a known masking agent, together with one of the
suspect's having a criminal history of drug smuggling. Because these compelling factors
are absent in both Godina-Luna and Robinson - they do not support to the trial court's
erroneous conclusion here.
In sum, the trial court's findings that a) the trooper observed and detected the
strong odor of a recognized masking agent, and that b) Ruiz had a criminal history of
drug smuggling, are themselves sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for any
detention beyond the traffic purpose of the stop. Add in facts that the stop occurred on a
known drug route, that neither defendant was authorized to possess or drive the car, and
that defendants exhibited unusual nervousness in consistently refusing to make eye
contact with the trooper, and reasonable suspicion is abundantly established here.
Because the trial court failed to properly view these factors as a totality, and also
misapprehended controlling Fourth Amendment authority, it erred as a matter of law in
concluding that reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking was absent here. The trial
court's suppression ruling therefore exceeds legal boundaries and should be reversed. Cf.
State v. Strausberg, 895 P.2d 831, 835 n.5 (Utah App. 1995); State v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d
8

922, 929 (Utah App. 1994) (evaluating custody determinations and observing that "fact
sensitive" determinations by a trial court are accorded a "measure of discretion," unless
the determination exceeds established legal boundaries.").
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS'POINXJI
A.

No Clear Error in Trial Court's Finding of Consent

The trial court found that defendants consented to the search, but that the search
was tainted by the preceding alleged illegal detention (R. 150), Aplt. Br., add. H.
Defendants "disagree" with the trial court's factual finding of consent. Aple. Br. at 13.
As previously noted, defendants as appellees may offer an alternative ground for
affirmance. South, 924 P.2d at 356-57. However, any alternative ground must be clearly
supported in the record. Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co., 657 P.2d at 301. Because the
trial court found that consent was given (R. 151), Aplt. Br., add. H, defendants once again
fail to demonstrate clear record support for their alternative ground that no consent
occurred, /\iid, as set forth below, they also fail to demonstrate any clear error in the trial
court's factual finding of consent. Defendants thus fail to present any valid alternative
ground for affirmance.
ttacking the trial court's finding of consent, defendants focus on the credibility
of Trooper Metz's testimony that he in fact requested consent. Aple. Br. at 1.3-

4

In Point 11(D) of their brief, defendants question the motivation of the troopers in
this case. The trial court dismissed these aspersions below, expressly declining to adopt
that portion of defendants' brief (R. 72). This Court should do likewise.
9

Thus, the dispute is a factual one. The^fore, defendants cannot prevail in their challenge
to the trial court's acceptance of the trooper's testimony over their own, without
demonstrating clear error therein. State v. Hargraves, 806 P.2d 228, 231 (Utah App.
1991); State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268 (Utah App. 1990) (recognizing that witness
credibility is a factual finding which the trial court is in the best position to evaluate).
This defendants have not, and cannot do. First, defendant's have not marshaled the
evidence supporting the trial court's finding of consent and demonstrated that viewed in
its most favorable light, it is insufficient to support the trial court's finding. See Aple. Br.
at 13-14. Cf. Moosman, 794 P.2d at 475. This is grounds alone to reject their claim.
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchg. 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991).
Second, even assuming defendants had properly marshaled the supporting
evidence, it is presumed on appeal that the fact-finder believed that evidence which
supports its verdict. See State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 905 (Utah) (jury), cert, denied, 804
P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990); Gardner v. Marsden, 949 P.2d 785, 790 (Utah App. 1997) (trial
court). Accordingly, the trooper's testimony that he obtained consent from defendant
Bracero (R. 160: 19-21), is alone sufficient to support the trial court's finding of consent.
Id. "Merely arguing that the trial court should have believed defendants' evidence, rather
than plaintiffs, does not meet the clear error standard." Gardner, 949 P.2d at 790.
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B.

No Necessity to Remand For Additional Findings

To the extent defendants suggest that defendant Bracero's consent was not
voluntary and knowing, the trial court did not make any explicit findings in this regard.
However, the trial court invalidated the consent on the sole ground that it was tainted by
the prior alleged illegal detention (R. 150), Aplt. Br., add. H. Thus, assuming the validity
of the detention, the reasonable inference from the trial court's ruling is that the consent
was otherwise knowing and voluntary. State v, Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 788 n.6 (Utah
1991) (reviewing court upholds the trial court even if it failed to make findings on the
record whenever it would be reasonable to assume that the court actually made such
findings).
The inference of a knowing and voluntary consent is also supportable in the
record. Trooper Metz claimed no authority to search, nor was the consent obtained by a
show offeree, or by deception or trick (R. 160: 19-21), Aplt. Br., add. C. And,
defendants were cooperative (id). See State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah
1980) (factors relevant to knowing and voluntary consent include absence of a show of
authority or force, deception or trick and the presence of a mere request and cooperation
by the owner). Defendants engage in no contrary analysis of the Whittenback factors.
See Aple. Br. at 14.
Therefore, assuming this Court accepts the State's argument and finds the
preceding detention lawful, there is no need to remand for findings on the validity of the
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otherwise untainted consenf to search which justified the seizure of contraband from
defendants' vehicle.5
CONCLUSION
Based on the above, the Court should overturn the trial court's erroneous
suppression of evidence in this case and remand for trial on the merits.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on 2 P October 1999.
JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General

fAN DECKER
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that o n j ^ October 1999,1 caused to be mailed, by U.S. Mail, postage
prepaid, two accurate copies of this REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT to:
ALAN DAYTON
JERE RENEER
275 North Main
P.O. Box 298
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660
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The State does not contend that the instant search was justified under any other
exception to the warrant requirement and therefore does not further respond to defendants
arguments in that regard. See Aple. Br. at 15-16.
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